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Elisabeth Zoller 13 begins Part I with observations on "The Distinc
tion between Man and the Citizen in the Declaration of 1789: Past
Significance and Contemporary Relevance." She examines the tensions
that exist between the concept of "natural rights" and that of "civil
rights" granted by the state. Then she goes on to discuss, in a penetrating
and original way, two propositions that at first appear paradoxical, but
when skillfully explicated reveal their power and perverse inner logic.
First, that "government, and government alone, can 'secure,' 'preserve.'
enforce human rights," but that, consequently, "the more we extend the
rights of man internationally, the more we diminish the rights of the
citizen domestically."
Yves Jeanclos analyzes 14 the social and legal significance and
importance of the Declaration in 18th-century France. Jeanclos stresses
the influence of indigenous French liberalism, particularly that of
Montesquieu, over American tutelage in the formulation of the Dec
laration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789. From here, he
proceeds to amplify Zoller's insistence on the symbiotic relationship
between government power and the preservation of rights, by reminding
us, again in a form that appears superficially paradoxical, that "the
Declaration of 1789 is interested... [in] the concept of man versus the state,
or rather man in the state." He then undertakes to examine the economic
consequences of this Janus-faced solicitude, illustrating for us how the
Constituent Assembly, in attempting to protect "the new man ...homo
oeconomicus" not only "from all judicial and economic chains, but
also...against his own penchant for economic submissiveness," suc
ceeded instead only in "smothering" him.
Stanley Hoffmann 15 offers "A Comparison of the French and
American Conceptions of Human Rights." In his analysis, he reprises
Zoller's distinction between the "rights of man," or "natural rights," and
the "rights of citizens," or "civil rights." He then proceeds to trace the
historical association of the "natural rights" tradition, from Montesquieu
through the French Revolution and down to the present, primarily with
concern for individual and political rights; and that of the "civil rights"
tradition, from Rousseau through the Revolution and down to the
present, primarily with concern for economic and social rights. Hoffmann
illustrates the practical, long-term consequences of these associations in
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agreement on the need to give priority to a more urgent task." 12
It should not surprise us, then, that a document of such universally
acknowledged centrality to the Revolution and its significance should
also constitute an important point of departure for the authors whose
observations are included in this collection. Yves Jeanclos, for example,
asserts simply that: "The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man
adopted the 10th of December 1948 by the General Assembly of the
United Nations is a continuation of the Declaration of 1789." Elizabeth
Zoller disagrees, saying that the 1948 U.N. Declaration hedges, and the
1789 Declaration does not, on the question of whether human beings
possess natural rights ("rights of man") anterior to being granted civil
rights ("rights of the citizen"). Valerie Epps also disagrees, but in a
different way. She argues that the 1948 Declaration goes well beyond
the enumeration of individual and political rights to be found in the 1789
Declaration, and well beyond anything that is implied therein, by
introducing economic, social, and collective rights. Thus, she says, the
1948 U.N. Declaration is no mere "continuation" of the 1789 Declaration,
but an important expansion on it, by which we "turn another corner of
the revolution and begin to deemphasize our rights as individuals in
order to pursue some of our collective rights." Without specifically
mentioning the 1948 Declaration, Stanley Hoffmann endorses Epps's
position that the recognition of economic, social, and cultural "collective"
rights represents not an extension of the 1789 Declaration, but a
portentous expansion beyond it. He insists, however, that such "col
lective" rights are neither less "real" than the individual ones catalogued
in 1789 nor any less "protections against arbitrariness." And, similarly,
Francis Rosenstiel also stresses the need to move beyond "the indis
pensable civil and political rights" recognized in 1789 to guarantee
"economic and social rights" for "those second-class citizens...for
whom [political rights] have still little point as long as the basic needs
of life are not satisfied."
Such is the nature of the lively debate to be found in the articles that
follow. These papers attempt to articulate some of the many ways in
which the French Revolution and its principal political/cultural artifact,
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, are connected
with the dramatic events and tendencies in contemporary Europe and
the world.
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you highly prize." There is nothing to add to this profound observation.
We may perhaps give a concrete example to illustrate the point. No piece
of legislation illustrates this idea better than United States antitrust laws.
The antitrust laws were enacted to protect competitors and consumers
from the unilateral or concerted exercise of market power. This is a
typical example where action by the Government-under the form of
legislation-is necessary to secure and preserve the natural rights of
other men. The State has to intervene as an umpire between conflicting
rights. In that case, if there were no government, we would have no
rights, except for those of us strong enough to enforce their own rights,
perhaps at gun-point.
Clearly therefore, the true, real human rights can only be those of
the citizen. Human rights are elusive to grasp without being transformed
into civil rights, that is to say, without-as the French Declaration
indicates-their limits set by the law (article 4) and their affectiveness
guaranteed by a public force (article 12). Therefore, the most important
step is accomplished by what Bracton called the constitutio libertatis,
in other words, by the enactment of a Constitution. The Constitution is
the cornerstone of liberty and its best guarantee. This is precisely what
article 16 of the Declaration says: "Any society in which the guarantee
of rights is not assured...lacks a constitution." Here again we find
considerable similarity between the views of the National Assembly
and the Founding Fathers. Looking at theFederalist, we come across the
same idea. I am referring to the letter in which Hamilton commented
upon the opening of the American Constitution ("We, the people...do
ordain and establish this Constitution") as follows: "Here is a better
recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which...
would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of
government." The only French Constitution which may be considered
as having trusted Hamilton so to speak, is the Constitution of the Third
Republic which refrained to allude in any manner to the Declaration of
1789 and which, despite this omission, established the most liberal
government ever to rule the country. The importance of a constitutional
enactment as a requisite for any human rights enforcement mechanism
leads me to my third and final set of remarks.
The French Government celebrated the Bicentennial of the French
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In the United States, the mode of interpretation through the mecha
nism of judicial supremacy-that is the judiciary arrogating to itself the
power to be the final interpreter of the scope of the powers of the three
branches of government--came about largely by historical chance and
probably through the personal animosities of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and the President of the day and not through any
overriding sense of the Framers that such was the best system. I happen
to think that judicial supremacy has worked fairly well in the American
context, not because of any pristine sense that this is the best principle
devised by man but rather because of the particular social and political
history of the United States itself and the numerous shortcomings in the
personnel of the legislature and the executive.
Limitation on central government was to be effected by a tripartite
system of government with various mechanisms for checking each
others powers, with separate powers to some extent but with overlap
ping powers in other significant enterprises. The powers of the legislature,
executive, and judiciary were spelled out, and limitations were spe
cifically placed upon state power. The people, as such, do not receive
much mention except that they were to elect their representatives in the
House. "They," of course, meant white, male property owners. Limited
black suffrage was not contemplated until the Fifteenth Amendment of
1870, and female enfranchisement did not take place until 1920. The
notion of equal participation, one person--one vote, based on personhood
alone, did not emerge until the 1960's. It is salutary to remember that as
Jefferson noted in his discussion of the wording of the Declaration of
Independence that: "The clause... reprobating the enslaving the inhab
itants of Africa was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and
Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves,
and who on the contrary still wished to continue it." Indians are
specifically referred to as "merciless...savages."
The Constitution then is largely power-granting, power-dividing
and mechanistic in its approach. It is not, largely, a manifesto of declared
rights-except perhaps the general great right to live under a govern
ment as devised by the Constitution, admittedly not an insignificant
right.
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